An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field

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	An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field
	Wei, Qi; Ding, Ya-Nan
	2022-03-20
发表期刊	Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science
ISSN	1000-6923
卷号	42 期号:3 页码:1456-1465
摘要	Considering that the low-carbon strategies of enterprises and consumers are often affected by government subsidy policies, this paper constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of consumers, relevant enterprise and the government, and discussed the influence mechanism of various factors on the strategy choice of each subject. The results show that: The low-carbon behaviors of enterprises are positively driven by government subsidies, low carbon preference of consumers, opportunity cost of giving up low-carbon production and market loss, and negatively driven by the cost of production mode change; The low-carbon behaviors of consumers are positively driven by the intensity of government subsidies and the benefit of low carbon preference, and negatively driven by the price difference between low-carbon products and ordinary products; The government chooses to subsidize consumers only when the potential benefits exceed the difference between the cost of consumption subsidy and production subsidy process; otherwise, the government is more inclined to subsidize production. This paper used simulation tools to verify the above conclusions, which helped to promote all mitigation actions countermeasures and suggestions were put forward. © 2022, Editorial Board of China Environmental Science. All right reserved.
关键词	Carbon Consumer behavior Carbon production Carbon trading Consumption reductions Evolutionary games Generalized carbon trading Government subsidies Low carbon Low carbon production Low-carbon consumption Tripartite evolutionary game
收录类别	EI
语种	中文
出版者	Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences
EI入藏号	20221411913658
EI主题词	Emission control
EI分类号	451.2 Air Pollution Control ; 804 Chemical Products Generally ; 931.3 Atomic and Molecular Physics
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	https://ir.lut.edu.cn/handle/2XXMBERH/158058
专题	经济管理学院
作者单位	School of Economic and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou; 730050, China
第一作者单位	兰州理工大学
第一作者的第一单位	兰州理工大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wei, Qi,Ding, Ya-Nan. An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field[J]. Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science,2022,42(3):1456-1465.
APA	Wei, Qi,&Ding, Ya-Nan.(2022).An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field.Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science,42(3),1456-1465.
MLA	Wei, Qi,et al."An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field".Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science 42.3(2022):1456-1465.