Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market
Wei, Qi; Li, Lin-Jing
2020-02-20
发表期刊Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science
ISSN10006923
卷号40期号:2页码:919-928
摘要Under the consideration of emission reduction efficiency and the purpose of maximizing the economic surplus in the carbon market, a two-stage dynamic game mechanism between the government and duopoly enterprises was constructed, and the effects of graded and progressive punishment mechanism on the power generation, profits of large and small enterprises and economic surplus were studied. The results showed that with the increase of penalty coefficient, if the large power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation, total profit and economic surplus decreased by 7.47%, 15.34% and 5.88%; if the small power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation decreased by 1.43%, the total profit decreased by 3.39% or increased by 0.03%, and the economic surplus increased by 0.13%; if the large power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 16.35%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 15.34%; if the small power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 3.39%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit increased by 0.03%. Therefore, when designing a punishment mechanism for the power generation industry, we should increase the penalties and set up a graded and progressive punishment mechanism, according to the enterprise scale and carbon market participation, and an effective supervision system should be established. © 2020, Editorial Board of China Environmental Science. All right reserved.
关键词Carbon Dynamics Profitability Carbon emission trading Dynamic game Graded and progressive Penalty coefficient Power generation enterprise Power generation industries Punishment mechanism Supervision systems
收录类别EI
语种中文
出版者Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences
EI入藏号20201108299296
EI主题词Emission control
EI分类号451.2 Air Pollution Control ; 804 Chemical Products Generally ; 911.2 Industrial Economics
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符https://ir.lut.edu.cn/handle/2XXMBERH/150706
专题经济管理学院
作者单位School of Economic and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou; 730050, China
第一作者单位兰州理工大学
第一作者的第一单位兰州理工大学
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GB/T 7714
Wei, Qi,Li, Lin-Jing. Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market[J]. Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science,2020,40(2):919-928.
APA Wei, Qi,&Li, Lin-Jing.(2020).Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market.Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science,40(2),919-928.
MLA Wei, Qi,et al."Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market".Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science 40.2(2020):919-928.
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